第36章 《佃农理论》英语原著 (30)
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第36章 《佃农理论》英语原著 (30)
Thelandownerwillfurnish[somanycatties]ofseed,togetherwith[somanypairs]ofwaterbuffalo,[somanyhead]ofdonkeys,andallessentialfarmingequipment.Thedur-ableassetsareforusepurposesonly,andshallnotbedamagedorlost[bythetenant]……andtheymustbere-turnedtothelandownerwithoutdelayattheterminationofthelease.The[aforementioned]rentalrateissubjecttoadjustmentaccordingtolocalcustomsinafamineyear.[4]
Theabovesamplesoffixed（crop）rentcontractsarethemostrepresentativeIcouldfind.Theyareidenticaltocashrentcontractsinallaspectsexceptthatinthelatterrentalpaymentsarestatedinmonetaryunits.[5]AccordingtoobservationscollectedbytheDepartmentofRealEstates,coveringtwenty-twoprov-incesinChina,cashrentsaregenerallyslightlylowerthancroprents.[6]Thisdifferentialcanbeexplainedbylandowners'sharingintheproductsellingcostundertakenbytenants.Wemayalsonotethatwithinflationoccurringin1938,owingtotheSino-JapaneseWar,beginningin1937,13.3percentofcashrentswereconvertedintocroprentsand15.3percentwereconvertedintosharerents.[7]Thisobservation,ofcourse,isconsistentwithminimizingtransactioncost.Underinflation,renegotiationofcashrentcontractsbeesmorefrequentandthusmorecostly.
Thecharacteristicsoffixed-rentcontractsarenotofspecialinterestexceptforonefeaturewhichwesingleouttoelaborateonhere-thefrequentinclusionoftheprovisionforrentalreduc-tionaccordingto"localcustoms"ina"famine"year（seesamplesaandc）,aprovisionwhichisabsentunderan"iron-sheet"rent（seesampleb）.Letuscallthisprovisionanescapeclauseforthetenant,theinclusionofwhichinafixed-rentcontractimposesariskburdenonthelandowner.
Wemayinterpret"localcustoms"asasetofmarketpricesfor"famine"adjustments,eventhoughtheexactmagnitudeofthepossiblereductionofrentisnotstatedwhenthecontractissigned.Theescapeclauseesintoplayonlyinayearso"bad"thatthemarketconsidersittobea"famine."Givenasufficientlylargenumberoffixed-rentcontractswhichincludetheescapeclause,petitionamonglandownerstokeeptheirtenantswillyieldcertainmarketratesofrentalreductionwhicheachland-ownerwillfollow.Otherthingsbeingequal,theincreasedriskburdenonthelandownerassociatedwiththeinclusionoftheescapeclauseimpliesthatapremiumwillbeaddedtothe"fixed"rentoverthe"iron-sheet."[8]
Althoughshiftingtheriskburdenbyincludingtheescapeclauseinafixed-rentcontractisnotquitethesameastheriskdispersioninasharecontract,wemayimaginetheformationofsharecontractsviatheescapeclause.Suppose"famine"isdefinedasoccurringwhentheactualharvestisreducedtoacertainpercentoftheexpectedmeanyieldowingtonaturalcauses.Thetenantunderfixedrenthastheoptiontochoosebetweenagreeingtoan"iron-sheet"contractorbuyingan"escape"rightbypayingan"insurance"premiumtothelandowner-suchthatintheeventof"famine,"rentalpaymentwillbereducedbyacertainpercentageaccordingtoamarketrule.
Tofurthertheargument:therecouldexistinthemarketplacenotjustoneescapeclauseasobserved,butawiderangeofsimilarclauseseachassociatedwithadifferentlevelof"famine,"suchthatthetenantcouldobtainanyorseveralofthembypayingdifferentpremiumstothelandowner.Assuch,theriskburdencouldbedispersedbetweenthecontractingpartiesinaninfinitenumberofways,eachwithslightlydifferentarrangements.Thishypotheticalworldwouldperhapsexistifthecostsofnegotiatingandmarketingallthedifferentescapeclauseswerezero.Butwithincreasingtransactioncostassociatedwithadditionalescapeclauses-inparticular,thecostofdefiningdifferentlevelsof"famine"inthemarketplace,andthecostofnegotiatingtherentalreductionforeach-theincrementalgainsofhavingthemmaybesosmallthatnofurther"custom"isdevelopedbythemarket.Instead,analternativedevicechosenisasharecontract,underwhichmultiple"escape"provisionsforthetenantwillbeimplicit,andwithinwhichtherentalpaymentisnolongerfixed.[9]
Fromtheaboveonemaydeducetwoimplicationswithrespecttotransactioncostandriskaversion.First,Ihavearguedthatthetransactioncostishigherforsharerentthanforfixedrent,pendingempiricalconfirmation.Observedcontractualarrange-mentsinChinasuggestthatthetransactioncostforawiderangeofescapeclausesishigherthanforsharerent.Thereasonisthatawiderangeofescapeclauseswouldallowagreatervarietyofchoiceforriskdispersionthanasharecontract,andyetonlyoneescapeclauseisobservedasavailable.Thus,therangeofcontractualchoicesisconstrainedbytransactioncost.Second,since,asnotedearlier,evidenceindicatesthatsharerentisslightlyhigherthanfixedrentowingtotheaddedriskburdenimposedonthelandowner,Iconjecturethatthelandowner'sinewouldbehigherthanwithasharecontractifanescapeclausewereadoptedtotheeffectthatthetenant'sinevarianceisreducedtozero.Imaginativeasitmayseem,wefindthatsuchanescapeclauseexistsintherealworld,disguisedunderthenameofwagecontract.