第31章 《佃农理论》英语原著 (25)

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第31章 《佃农理论》英语原著 (25)

EarlO.HeadyandEarlW.Kehrbergconductedasurvey（Iowa,1949）withseventy-fourselectedpairsofcash-leaseandshare-leasefarms.Theyfound"nosignificantdifferencesbetweenshareandcashleases"（p.661）fortheinputintensitiesoffarming.Theauthors,however,refusedtoaccepttheconflictbetweentheirtheoryandfindings,andresortedtootherfactorswhich"mightaccountforthislackofdifference"（pp.661-62）.Withthetaxapproach,theyhadconcludedthat,intheory,farmingintensityundersharerentisnecessarilylowerthanundercashrent（atpp.658-60）.SeeHeadyandKehrberg,"RelationshipofCropShareandCashLeasingSystemstoFarmingEfficiency,"ResearchBulletin386（IowaStateCollegeAgriculturalExperimentStation,May,1952）,pp.635-83.

[16].Buck,ChineseFarmEconomy,p.156.Nonumericaldataareprovided.

[17].SeealsoLegislativeYuan,StatisticalMonthly（1930）,2,5.

[18].Thisisshownearlierinthissection.ForsomeindirectevidencefromTaiwan,seechapters7and8.

[19].orgputedfromdatainSino-AmericanJointCommissiononRuralRe-construction"JCRRAnnualReportsonLandReformintheRepublicofChina,"mimeographed（1965）,p.35.

[20].Onlyasmallamountofnumericaldatahasbeenprovided,andexamplesoflandownersholdingoveronethousandleasesareperhapscasesselectedtoemphasizetheconcentrationoflandownership.AccordingtoinformationprovidedinJ.P.Gittinger,"VietnameseLandTransferProgram,"LandEconomics（May,1957）,"beforethelandtransferprograminVietnam,2,170persons……havedeclaredtotalholdingsamountingto976,602hectares."Giventhat"theaveragetenantholdingisapproximately2hectaresorperhapsslightlymore,"theaveragenumberofleasesforeachoftheselandownerswasovertwohundred.

4.TransactionCosts,RiskAversion,andtheChoiceofContractualArrangements

Theanalysisthusfarhasbeenprimarilybasedontheconditionthattransactioncosts,andinparticularthecostsofcontractualnegotiationandenforcement,arezero.Thetheoryofsharetenancythereuponderivedshowsthat,subjecttotheconstraintofprivatepropertyrights,economicefficiencyisthesameundervariouslandtenurearrangements.Althoughtransactioncostsexistintherealworld,thetheorysucceedsinexplainingaclassofobservations.Butthepresenceofavarietyofcontractualarrangementsunderthesameconstraintofpetitionposesthequestion:Whyaredifferentcontractualarrangementschosenunderthesamesystemofprivatepropertyrights?Thepurposeofthischapteristoadvance,inaratherinformalmanner,achoice-theoreticapproachbasedonnonzerotransactioncostandriskaversiontoexplaintheobservedcontractualbehaviorinagriculture.TheobservationsusedarelargelydrawnfromtheChineseexperience.

Ifafirmcanincreaseefficiencyinproductionbyemployingproductiveresourcesofmorethanoneresourceowner,acontracttobinetheresourceswillobtain.Theformationofthecontractinvolvespartialtransfersofpropertyrightsinoneformoranother,suchasleasing,hiring,ormortgaging.[1]Thesetransfers,andtheassociatedcoordinationofinputsofvariousfactorsinproduction,arecostlyevents.[2]Therearecostsofnegotiatingandofenforcingthestipulationsofthecontract.

Giventhestateofpersonalwealthdistributionandtheportfoliosofassetsheldasprivatepropertybyresourceowners,someownerswillseekcontractualarrangementswithothersinbiningresourcesforproduction.[3]Thereisavarietyofarrangementsunderwhichthiscanbedone.Atleasttworeasonsmaybeofferedfortheexistenceofdifferenttypesofcontractualarrangements.Firstistheexistenceofnaturalrisk,definedhereasthecontributionbynatureorthestateoftheworldtothevariance（orstandarddeviation）oftheproductvalue.[4]Givenanonzerovariancefortheexpectedoutputyield（thetotalineforthecontractingparties）,differentcontractualarrangementsallowdifferentdistributionsofinevariancesamongthecontractingparties.Underthepostulateofriskaversion,anindividualwillseektoavoidriskifthecostofdoingsoislessthanthegainfromtheriskaverted.Hemayavertriskbysearchingforinformationaboutthefuture（whichmaynotbeattainableevenatinfinitelyhighcost）,bychoosinglessriskyoptionswheninvesting（whichoptionsincludeportfoliodiversification）,orbychoosingamongarrangementswithwhichhisburdenofriskcanbedispersedtootherindividuals-suchasinsuranceandvariouscontractualarrangements.Thelastisoneofourconcernsinthischapter.Asecondreasonfortheexistenceofdifferentcontractualarrangementsisthedifferenttransactioncoststhatareassociatedwitheach.Transactioncostsdifferbecausethephysicalattributesofinputandoutputdiffer,becauseinstitutionalarrangementsdiffer,andbecausedifferentsetsofstipulationsrequirevaryingeffortsinenforcementandnegotiation.[5]

Letmeadvancethefollowinghypothesis:thechoiceofcontractualarrangementismadesoastomaximizethegainfromriskdispersionsubjecttotheconstraintoftransactioncosts.Ishalldevelopthishypothesisandapplyittosomeobservationslater.